Taboo: The Journal of Culture and
Education
Volume 19
Issue 5 The Messy Affect(s) of Writing in the
Academcy

Article 4

December 2020

Chopped to Pieces, I Write Myself Together
Jim Burns
Florida International University, jburns@fiu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/taboo

Recommended Citation
Burns, J. (2020). Chopped to Pieces, I Write Myself Together. Taboo: The Journal of Culture and
Education, 19 (5). Retrieved from https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/taboo/vol19/iss5/4

This Article is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Scholarship@UNLV
with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Article in any way that is permitted by the
copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from
the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/
or on the work itself.
This Article has been accepted for inclusion in Taboo: The Journal of Culture and Education by an authorized
administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.

James
P. Burns
Taboo, Fall
2020

53

Chopped to Pieces,
I Write Myself Together
James P. Burns
Abstract
In this paper, the author reflects on being a writer in the academy in dialogue
with writers who have been instrumental in the author’s academic work: James
Baldwin, George Orwell, Eduardo Galeano, and Michel Foucault. The author
first contextualizes the paper in the current historical moment, characterized by
resurgent authoritarianism, the COVID-19 pandemic, and mass non-violent protests in response to the police murders of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor to
reiterate the importance of academic writers as public intellectuals. The author
then reflects on the messy affects of writing in the academy, particularly as a
pre-tenure faculty member, through four purposes, proposed by Orwell, that motivate most writers: sheer egoism, an aesthetic enthusiasm, historical impulse,
and political purpose. The author concludes that academic writing comprises an
aesthetics and ethics of the self as well as a political project of self-cultivation,
the embodiment of truth, and care for the world.
Keywords: academic writing; technologies of the self; parrhēsia; aesthetics; art
of living

Introduction
Why does one write, if not to put one’s pieces together? From the moment we enter school or church, education chops us into pieces: it teaches us to divorce soul
from body and mind from heart. The fishermen of the Columbian coast must be
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learned doctors of ethics and morality, for they invented the word sentipensante,
feeling-thinking, to define language that speaks the truth. (Galeano, 1992, p. 121)

When I submitted the first draft of this article in the late summer of 2019, the
world seemed different. Discourses of temporal difference, may, however, obfuscate or disavow the underlying conditions of possibility of the present. One year
later, the systemic shock of the COVID-19 pandemic and mass protests sparked
by the police murders of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor have rendered a myriad of preexisting historic injustices even more grotesquely visible. My hope in
these times, perhaps best expressed by Baldwin (1965/1998) through his prophetic writings on U.S. race relations, is that the crises we confront will illuminate
the history on which many white people find themselves “impaled…incapable
of seeing or changing themselves, or the world” (p. 723). In terms of education,
specifically academic writing, the historicization of oneself and the world in a
stubbornly ahistoric socio-political milieu (Pinar, 2012) resonates with a fundamental tenet of curriculum theory: self and social reconstruction.
Academics currently live, work, teach, and write in, and against, an era characterized by resurgent authoritarianism, economic precarity, a cult of irrationalism and hypermasculine violence, and impending environmental collapse. Globally, I see Eco’s (2001) Ur-Fascism,1 an ever-present set of characteristics, around
any one of which a “Fascist nebula will begin to coagulate” (p. 78), in operation.
From post-truth propaganda to intolerance of dissent and academic inquiry—for
example, attacks on gender studies (American Association of University Professors, 2018)—the academy faces some significant, perhaps existential challenges
in the United States and globally.
Considering the importance of academic writing to the health of intellectual
life, itself precarious in a society historically suspicious of intellectuals and driven
by the practical social engineering demands of the business-minded (Hofstadter,
1962; Pinar, 2006), the question of what it means to be a writer in the academy,
while always important, assumes greater urgency. Much as the COVID pandemic
has magnified numerous institutional disparities, the responses of many universities
to COVID have illuminated the academy’s complicity with the neoliberal project.
What might a disaster capitalist (Klein, 2007) response by university administrators
and governing boards to the COVID pandemic mean for writing as an expression of
humanist inquiry and the embodiment of ethics of justice? As a pre-tenure faculty
member, I often struggle with the tensions inherent in the technocratic obsession
with metrics that purport to assign a market value to my scholarly worth. I fear that
the increasingly gigified nature of the material conditions of academic work is further eroding already weakened principles of academic freedom, shared governance,
and what remains of institutional commitments to writing as a political practice
using, as Galeano (1992) suggests, language that speaks the truth.
In this essay, I engage with the messy affects of writing in the academy by
grappling with a fundamental question: why and for whom do I write? I structure

James P. Burns

55

my inquiry around four general motives—sheer egoism, aesthetic enthusiasm, historical impulse, and political purpose—which Orwell (1946/2005) suggests drive
all writers in varying degrees according to the times in which they live. Framing
this essay in Orwell’s (1946/2005) analysis of writers’ purposes and motivations,
I place myself in dialogue with Orwell, James Baldwin, and Michel Foucault.
These writers, each in their own way, discuss writing as a political, aesthetic, and
moral practice, a way of being in the world deeply entangled with the subjective
and the social, and an ethical commitment to seek and embody truth. Based on my
engagement with Orwell, Baldwin, and Foucault, whose work has influenced my
own, I understand writing as an art of self-cultivation in relationship with others
through which I situate myself historically, socially, and politically and act on my
emerging self-understanding toward reconstruction of the social world. I begin
with Orwell’s (1946/2005) first motive, sheer egoism.

Sheer Egoism
Writers, Baldwin (1993) notes, “are said to be extremely egotistical and
demanding” and their work, while they remain alive, “fatally entangled” with
their personal fortunes and misfortunes, personalities, and the “social facts and
attitudes” of their time (p. 182). For Baldwin (1993), the social facts and attitudes that inhere in his work revolve around “the question of color,” which, in the
United States, “operates to hide the graver questions of the self” (p. xiii). Orwell
(1946/2005) attributes writers’ egoism to their “desire to seem clever, to be talked
about, and to be remembered after death,” and he dismissed as “humbug” any
pretension that egoism isn’t a strong motivation to write (p. 4). He also suggests
that serious writers comprise a “minority of gifted, willful people who are determined to live their own lives to the end” whereas many people tend to “abandon
individual ambition” and succumb to the drudgery of living for others (Orwell,
1946/2005, p. 5). Both Baldwin (1993) and Orwell (1946/2005) imply that writers
live in an egoistic paradox, which emerges from several conflicting, and perhaps
generative, desires: to be immersed in their own subjectivities; to be affirmed
by others; to attain immortality through being discussed, remembered, and even
studied by others long after death; to live their own lives; and to embody truth as
a moral practice.
The tensions and contradictions inherent in the writer’s egoistic paradox
flourish in the academy, which deftly plays to the professorial ego using both
enticements and “subtle tactics of the sanction” (Foucault, 2015, p. 6)—promotion, tenure, merit pay, statistical hierarchization and differentiation—to leverage
the production of specific scholarly subjectivities. I also sense a contradiction
between the pretense of the academic pursuit of truth and post-truth discourses
that resemble “Newspeak” (Orwell, 1949), the goal of which is to “limit the instruments available to complex and critical reasoning” (Eco, 2001, p. 86). Con-
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sidering those contradictions, my integrity as a writer must, as Pinar (2006) suggests, include introspection into myself and principled critique of the institutions
through which I move and of my own academic field.
Which brings me to the other side of the egoistic paradox: the importance of
subjectivity to my ontology of writing. Interiority is a crucial thread through Baldwin’s work, which he characterizes as a “state of being alone” (1962/1998, p. 669).
For a writer, the state of being alone is “not meant to bring to mind merely a rustic
musing beside some silver lake” (Baldwin, 1962/1998, p. 669). Rather, the aloneness of a writer is a state in which one contemplates truly existential questions:
The aloneness of which I speak is much more like the fearful aloneness of birth
or death…. The states of birth, suffering, love, and death are extreme states:
extreme, universal, and inescapable. We all know this, but we would rather not
know it. The artist is present to correct the delusions to which we fall prey in our
attempts to avoid this knowledge. (Baldwin, 1962/1998, p. 669)

As a writer in the academy, I feel great resonance with the state of aloneness
described by Baldwin (1962/1998) as a politics of writing that troubles the intransigence of common sense, which so often reinscribes the injustices of the past
onto the present.
Indeed, Foucault (2005) characterizes self-care as a conversion to self, a
form of return that he explains through the metaphor of navigation, or a journey.
The cultivation of self-knowledge is a technology of the self, a “privilege-duty, a
gift-obligation that ensures our freedom while forcing us to take ourselves as the
object of all our diligence” (Foucault, 1984/1988, p. 47). Thus, the ancient art of
living associates care of one’s body with the care of one’s soul through self-examination of the principles inherent in the activities that one embodies, particularly
writing. Foucault (quoted in Martin, Gutman, & Hutton, 1988) describes a hermeneutics of technologies of the self, which function in conflict with technologies of
production, sign systems, and power, as practices that
permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and
way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality. (p. 18)

Writing, therefore, is a constant, complex “activity of speaking and writing in
which the work of oneself on oneself and communication with others” are linked
into “a true social practice” (Foucault, 1984/1988, p. 51), which forms a “system
of reciprocal obligations” (p. 54). During the Hellenistic era, writing became an
essential technology of the self that included “taking notes on oneself to be reread,
writing treatises and letters to friends to help them, and keeping notebooks in
order to reactivate for oneself the truths one needed” (Foucault quoted in Martin
et al., 1988, p. 27). Unlike the renunciation of the self that characterized Christian
asceticism, classical philosophy privileged “the progressive consideration of the
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self, or mastery over oneself, obtained not through the renunciation of reality but
through the acquisition and assimilation of truth” (Foucault quoted in Martin et
al., 1988, p. 35). For me, academic writing, emerges from an ancient, complex set
of practices associated with the art of living through which we care for, cultivate,
and come to know ourselves both in solitude and with the guidance of others.
I often wonder if writing as a social practice is in danger of disappearing. It
is possible, absent the context of his broad body of work, to misinterpret Orwell’s
(1946/2005) suggestion that writers are motivated partially by sheer egoism and
dismiss writing, and writers, as the windows through which we see and are seen.
Considering the systems of governmentality formed by the “contact between
technologies of domination of others and those of the self” (Foucault quoted in
Martin et al., 1988, p. 19), I have developed a deeper appreciation for writing as a
social practice of self-cultivation based on a system of reciprocal obligations. The
complexities of subjectivity connect with Orwell’s (1946/2005) second motive to
write, aesthetic enthusiasm, which signifies writing as an artform entangled with
an aesthetics of the self.

Aesthetic Enthusiasm
The return to the self through the act of writing signals writing as an ethics
and aesthetics of the self, which transcends superficial contemporary expressions
of self-help, authenticity, and “getting back to oneself” (Foucault, 2005, p. 251).
The sense of writing as an aesthetic practice was perhaps best exemplified during
the Hellenistic Age when “writing prevailed, and real dialectic passed to correspondence,” and care for oneself “became linked to a constant writing activity”
(Foucault quoted in Martin et al., 1988, p. 27). It is that sense of writing that
Foucault (2005) suggests has remained elusive in the modern era despite efforts
to revive it. Part of writing as an aesthetics of the self lies in the pleasure derived
from the intimacy of writing as a social practice, particularly the relationship “between the care of the self and philosophical love, or the relation to the master”
(Foucault quoted in Martin et al., 1988, p. 26), which revealed the ars erotica
imbricated with the cultivation of the self through writing. For example, Marcus
Aurelius, in a letter from 144-45 CE to his master, Fronto, described his activities,
health, mood, and conscience during a rural retreat to put Aurelius “in contact”
with himself, and he expressed his love for Fronto in closing (Foucault quoted in
Martin et al., 1988, p. 29).
Similarly, Baldwin (1993) discusses the aesthetics of writing as a continuous
practice of self-examination:
I still believe that the unexamined life is not worth living: and I know that self-delusion, in the service of no matter what small or lofty cause, is a price no writer can
afford. His subject is himself and the world and it requires every ounce of stamina
he can summon to attempt to look on himself and the world as they are. (p. xii)

58

Chopped to Pieces, I Write Myself Together

The necessity for a writer to live an examined life resonates with the sense of writing as an aesthetics of the self and Baldwin’s (1962/1998) characterization of the
writer as “that incorrigible disturber of the peace” (p. 669) with whom all societies
have historically battled. Much as Foucault (2008) suggests that civil society is
a governmental technology predicated on economic logics, Baldwin (1962/1998)
portrays the purpose of society as maintaining order and habituating the people
to traditions from which they derive their identity and, thus, governability. The
writer’s responsibility to society, and writing as an aesthetic act, is to “never cease
warring with” society, for society’s sake and for the sake of the writer (Baldwin,
1962/1998, p. 670).
Aesthetic enthusiasm, for Orwell (1946/2005), can reflect the “perception of
beauty in the external world”; “pleasure in the impact of one sound on another,
in the firmness of good prose or the rhythm of a good story”; and the “desire
to share an experience which one feels is valuable and ought not to be missed”
(Orwell, 1946/2005, p. 5). Importantly, Orwell (1946/2005) expressed the goal of
his political writing as the elevation of “political writing into an art form,” and
he could not write “if it were not also an aesthetic experience” in which he took
pleasure (p. 8). Thus, as an aesthetic practice, writing, by seeking a more complex
understanding of personal and social history, can reveal the beauty of the world.
Foucault (2003) might characterize the revelatory power of writing as genealogical inquiry that can uncover knowledges and traditions that have been eliminated
from academic institutions as unsophisticated, non-erudite, and inconvenient to
partial, yet totalizing white Western narratives. Baldwin (1962/1998) similarly
embodies a politics of writing through which the aesthetic experience of writing
helps one discover “that life is tragic, and, therefore, unutterably beautiful” (p.
671). Through my own writing, I have learned that beauty can exist in the tragedy
of the truth, specifically in the stories of resistance and counter-conduct that we
can uncover through our academic work. Further, part of the beauty of writing
lies, paradoxically, in the willingness to speak the truth about ourselves, which is
typically “at variance with what we wish to be” (Baldwin, 1962/1998, p. 671).
Writing as an aesthetic practice integral to the art of living, thus, forms a
“whole field of experience” including detailed introspection and the development
of a relationship “between writing and vigilance” in which one pays attention to
the “nuances of life” (Foucault quoted in Martin et al., 1988, p. 28). Care of the
self and the art of living are intertwined in a relationship to the self that is simultaneously imbricated with the presence of others who help us situate ourselves in
the world and provoke us to act ethically (Foucault, 2005). The aesthetic impulse
that I seek to cultivate transcends the superficial, commercialized sense of “finding myself” or accumulating a “bucket list” of pleasurable experiences and their
associated artifacts. I do not seek to use writing instrumentally to quantify my
worth to “the field” as an academic writer. Rather, I am attempting to embody an
aesthetics of the self as an ethic of self-care and self-cultivation through a practice
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of writing not merely for others, but in relationship with others who can guide me
toward ethical action in the world. The practice of writing is an act of vigilance,
of attending to myself as an ethics of caring for others and the world, which is
entangled with an impulse to situate myself historically, to which I now turn.

Historical Impulse
To enact an ethics of the self requires an understanding of oneself in the
context of history. One of the tragedies associated with times like those in which
we currently live is the historic inability to transcend such times. Instead, the
discursive lack of historicality often results in the reinscription of the past on
the present and the future. For example, present phenomena such as post-truth,
authoritarianism, and police violence against persons of color emerge from extensive intersected histories. Yet, an ahistoric presentism often afflicts social, political, and educational discourses, which reduces the complexities of the present
to a “flattened never-ending ‘now’” (Pinar, 2012, p. 227). Baldwin (1965/1998)
reminds us, however, that history
does not refer merely, or even principally, to the past. On the contrary, the great
force of history comes from the fact that we carry it within us, are unconsciously
controlled by it in many ways, and history is literally present in all that we do.
It could scarcely be otherwise, since it is to history that we owe our frames of
reference, our identities and our aspirations. (p. 723)

Thus, we can see the disavowal of the history white supremacy in discourses
from “all lives matter” and “personal responsibility” to the devotion of many to
neo-Confederate iconography, which purports that symbols such as the Confederate flag and statues of Confederate leaders are monuments to cultural heritage
rather than to slavery and white ethnonationalism. In contrast to historical disavowal, Baldwin (1993) suggests that the aesthetic endeavor of an examined life
requires a willingness “to free ourselves of the myth of America” (p. 11), a difficult task in a country that distrusts intellectuals precisely because they threaten to
complicate or destroy that myth.
Orwell’s (1946/2005) historical impulse to write, and his political purpose,
were contextualized in his experiences with British colonialism, fighting against
Fascism in Spain, the aftermath of World War II, and the emerging Cold War. He
wrote not to catalog facts and events, but to reconcile his “ingrained likes and dislikes with the essentially public, non-individual activities” that each age forces on
all of humanity (p. 9). Orwell (1946/2005) also considered his historical impulse
to write imbricated with the “construction of language,” which raised, for him, the
“problem of truthfulness” (p. 9). Thus, Orwell’s (1949) “Newspeak” illuminated
the danger of post-truth politics more than four decades before playwright Steve
Tesich coined the term “post-truth” in 1992.
My scholarly interest in the effects of technologies of institutional power an-

60

Chopped to Pieces, I Write Myself Together

imates my historical impulse to write. Foucault’s (2003) method and tactic of
genealogy has, therefore, inspired my politics of writing over the years. Genealogy couples “scholarly erudition and local memories, which allows us to constitute a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of that knowledge in
contemporary tactics” (Foucault, 2003, p. 8). I have found genealogy crucial to
my understanding of the production of knowledges that effect power, and also to
excavate local knowledges—“what people know” (Foucault, 2003, p. 8)—which
have been institutionally subjugated. The pursuit of writing as an aesthetic genealogical project in search of a more complex, truthful understanding of the present
requires, as Baldwin (1993) suggests, questioning tradition. Genealogy as a method and a historical and political project illuminates the conditions of possibility
that produce the present, which can help us see, as Orwell (1946/2005) suggests,
not only things as they really are, but how the present came to be. Excavating different voices, knowledges, and memories resonates with an aesthetics of the self
and may, as Baldwin (1965/1998) concludes, assess how history has subjectively formed us and recreate ourselves “according to a principle more humane and
more liberating” (p. 723). Through such a project, which is inherently political,
we might, in the language of curriculum theory, reconstruct ourselves and contribute to historical change.

Political Purpose
We live, as Orwell (1946/2005) described his own time, in a “tumultuous, revolutionary age” (p. 4). At the very least, the current times have the potential to
become such an age, hopefully in pursuit of a truly just society. Taken together,
Orwell’s (1946/2005) four impulses to write, sheer egoism, aesthetic enthusiasm,
historical impulse, and political purpose, “must war against one another” and “fluctuate from person to person and from time to time” (p. 6). As a police officer in
Burma, Orwell developed a hatred of imperialism; his impoverishment evoked his
awareness of class struggle; and the rise of Hitler, participation in the resistance
during the Spanish Civil War, and the Soviet counter-revolution illuminated the
threat of totalitarianism. The times during which Orwell (1946/2005) lived impelled
him to write for a political purpose, and he concluded: “It seems to me nonsense, in
a period like our own, to think that one can avoid writing of such subjects” (p. 8). To
avoid confronting the existential crises we currently face would be to abdicate my
ethical and political responsibility as a public intellectual to others.
Baldwin’s vast political project dealt with myriad aspects of race relations,
both internationally and in the United States, a particularly interesting aspect of
which was the complex relationship between the North and the South. His observation about race as an entanglement of power and sex (Baldwin, 1993), an overt
reference to lynching and rape as a technology of domination, are as relevant today as ever. That observation reflects Baldwin’s (1993) own genealogical thinking
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through which present issues—police terror against communities of color; health,
educational, and housing discrimination; economic dispossession; mass incarceration; misogyny; and the epidemic of violence perpetrated against Black Trans
Women—emerged through technologies of power, including the persistence of
academic discourses that sought to scientifically rationalize racial hierarchies
(see Foucault, 1970/1994). Baldwin’s (1993) politics of writing further extends
to the “extremely dangerous luxury” in which Northern white people indulge:
the illusion that “because they fought on the right side during the Civil War, and
won, they have earned the right merely to deplore what is going on in the South”
(p. 69). That political observation was also expressed by Martin Luther King,
Junior’s (1963/2000) disappointment with the white moderate “more devoted to
‘order’ than to justice” (p. 96). That critique remains pertinent today, particularly
among elite establishment liberals who continue to deplore police violence and
racism but engage in purely performative acts in support of racial justice.
To summarize the politics of writing that inspires me, I return to Foucault
(quoted in Martin et al., 1988), who noted the Hellenistic linkage between writing as self-care and political activity. One tension that emerges from writing as
a technology of the self and political activity centers on the question: “When is
it better to turn away from political activity and concern oneself with oneself?”
(Foucault quoted in Martin et al., 1988, p. 26). As a pre-tenure faculty member, I
do sometimes struggle to balance my political engagement with the need to return
to and care for myself so that I can continue meaningful engagement in the world.
Thus, writing for me is both a journey of engagement and a return to myself.
Foucault (2011) also speaks of a parrhēsiastic ethics of truth telling as self-care
through writing in which “the self is something to write about, a theme or object
(subject) of writing activity” (Foucault, quoted in Martin et al., 1988, p. 27). Particularly in the current historical moment, I am concerned about the manipulation
of language to obfuscate and dehistoricize rather than reveal truth. To embody the
courage of truth as a parrhēsiastic practice, one must speak truth “without concealment, reserve, empty manner of speech, or rhetorical ornament which might encode
or hide it” (Foucault, 2011, p. 10). One is also bound to the consequences of one’s
speech, which reflects the risks inherent in speaking and seeking truth, such as angering others, learning that one’s beliefs are untrue, and even physical or political
death. Parrhēsia is, therefore, a “way of being which is akin to a virtue, a mode of
action” (Foucault, 2011, p. 25) rather than rhetorical techniques that conceal meaning. As a technology of the self, parrhēsia privileges the importance of others as
interlocutors who can help guide one toward a better understand oneself, others, and
the world. Writing for the political purpose of seeking truth helps situate oneself in
and connect with the world, impels one to action, and establishes limits on one’s
actions (Foucault, 2005). I view my interlocutors in the parrhēsiastic “game” as my
guides, the ones to whom I write, and the ones who impel me to reckon with myself
(Foucault, 2005). Ultimately, I write, as Galeano (1989) suggests, for myself, as a
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technology and aesthetics of the self, and a historical and political project through
which I write for others as well.

Concluding Thoughts
The question “What are we today?” introduced Foucault’s (quoted in Martin
et al., 1988) emerging line of inquiry into the modern political rationality that
seeks to mediate the tensions between increasing individuation and the reinforcement of the totality of the state, between the “social entity and the individual”
(p. 153). The political technology of individuals—biopolitics—emerges from the
reason of the modern nation-state, the paradox of which lies in the coexistence
of “large destructive mechanisms and institutions oriented toward the care of individual life” (Foucault quoted in Martin et al., 1988, p. 147). The biopolitical
rationality endemic in the police powers of the modern state focuses solely on
the perpetuation of nation-states concerned with individuals only insofar as they
have some productive utility. Thus, states aggregate individuals into populations,
which is “nothing more than what the state takes care of for its own sake” (Foucault quoted in Martin et al., 1988, p. 160).
How does any of this relate to the messy affect(s) of writing in the academy?
Political technologies of individuation function in all the institutions that comprise
the modern state through extractive logics that render individuals objects of inquiry
to produce knowledges that form useful self-governing subjects. Biopolitics is also
a crucial analytical lens for my research, particularly the militarization of the carceral state, creeping fascism, white ethnonationalist violence, and increasingly onerous
technologies of surveillance and propaganda. Importantly, I am interested in both
sides of the biopolitical coin. The power of the nation-state, and all its institutions,
including the academy, to foster life coexists with the power to disallow life, which
Foucault (quoted in Martin et al., 1988) calls thanatopolitics. Concerning academic work, the logics of neoliberalism to which academic institutions have largely
succumbed operate according to the same biopolitical rationality that concerned
Foucault. For example, sophisticated data-driven technologies function as a form
of police power to chop individuals into increasingly minute pieces of data and either foster or disallow their existence based on their quantifiable institutional utility.
Inherent in the politics of individuals is the politics of life and death, a frightening
prospect considering the last century of human history.
On the other hand, I wonder what one of Foucault’s famous strategic reversals might look like in the academy and in a biopolitical society. How might we
reverse the biopolitical rationality that forms and fosters a reductive subjectivity
based on the utility of individuals to institutions? How might we as writers in
the academy embrace writing as an aesthetic practice of self-care animated by
a parrhēsiastic ethic, which might subvert the extractive logics inherent in the
academy, and society? I have no firm answers to those questions, but reflecting
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constantly on the politics of writing, I believe, is essential to the work of academics
as public intellectuals. Although the authors with whom I engaged in this paper
emerged from different subjective positions, they all regarded writing as an aesthetic, ethical, and political act of authoring themselves. Writing, from that perspective,
is more than sine qua non to the academy. Writing is also sine qua non to the art of
living.

Note
Eco’s characteristics of Ur-Fascism include: the cult of tradition; a rejection of modernism; irrationalism; intolerance of dissent; fear of difference; authoritarian populist appeals to the frustrated; an obsession with conspiracies, particularly regarding outsiders; a
propagandized humiliation at the hands of outsiders; glorification of permanent war; scorn
for the weak; the cult of death; transferring the will to power to sexual questions; the rejection of democracy; and the use of “Newspeak” to circumvent critical thought.
1
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